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HEED NOT THE UMPIRE (JUSTICE GINSBURG CALLED NFIB) 
Nicole Huberfeld∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
To understand the scale of the national problems addressed by 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the ACA”), think of 
everyone you know who has blue eyes.  Now imagine that every one of 
those people does not have health insurance.  This means that they 
cannot gain access to the healthcare system except by visiting an 
emergency room, unless they have large amounts of liquid assets and 
can pay out of pocket.  Some of the blue-eyed people will be healthy, 
some may have chronic conditions, some may be terminally ill; but, 
their health status only serves to keep them out of the health insur-
ance market and thus distant from consistent medical care, unless 
they qualify for federal programs by virtue of their age or their pov-
erty.  This was the scale of the problem at the time of the 2008 presi-
dential election: nearly fifty million Americans did not have health 
insurance because the old mechanisms for obtaining insurance were 
failing.  Just as one in six Americans has blue eyes, likewise one in six 
Americans had no health insurance, and the inability to obtain access 
to medical care had become as random as birth traits.1 
The pervasiveness of our healthcare problem seems to have by-
passed most justices on the Supreme Court in the landmark case Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).2  And early 
commentary predominantly has focused on the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate, which codified the idea that Americans must 
have minimum health insurance coverage by January 1, 2014 or pay a 
tax penalty.3  Further narrowing the conversation, much of the post-
decision commentary has also focused on Chief Justice Roberts’s con-
 
 ∗ Gallion & Baker Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.  Comments are welcome: ni-
cole.huberfeld@uky.edu.  Many thanks to Elizabeth Weeks Leonard for her insights and 
to Shannon Leahy and Kathryn Swany for diligent research assistance.  Thanks always DT. 
 1 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Health Data Interactive: No Health Insur-
ance, Under Age 65: US 1999–2010 (Source: NHIS), http://205.207.175.93/HDI/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=453 (last visited Dec. 12, 2012) (displaying rates 
of uninsurance by age group and other demographic data). 
 2 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 3 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010). 
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stitutional analysis and its interplay with the joint dissent.4  This nar-
row scrutiny has resulted in missed opportunities: first, a critique of 
the justices’ stilted legislative interpretation and lack of deference to 
Congress’s legislative expertise.  And second, an appreciation for Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s dissenting and concurring opinion, which ap-
proached the constitutional questions in NFIB with an emphasis on 
understanding the nature of the healthcare crisis that led to the legis-
lative choices in the ACA.  Justice Ginsburg’s nuanced approach to 
the facts in NFIB led her to the correct constitutional analysis.  This 
essay will shine a light on these issues with a particular focus on Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s approach to the case. 
II.  THE ACA MISUNDERSTOOD 
Congress expressed a broad understanding of its enumerated 
powers in the ACA but did not exercise its Article I authority in a 
manner inconsistent with existing precedent.5  The ACA contained 
ten titles and many moving parts, but the broad goal of the law was to 
reform the national markets in healthcare to make all individuals in-
sured and insurable.  The two ACA provisions at issue in NFIB were 
the minimum essential coverage provision, which requires Americans 
to have a health insurance home by 2014 or pay a self-reported tax 
 
 4 See, e.g., David B. Rivkin Jr., Lee A. Casey & Andrew M. Grossman, NFIB v. Sebelius and the 
Triumph of Fig-Leaf Federalism, 2011–12 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2012/scr-2012-rivkin.pdf; ERIKA K. LUNDER & JENNIFER 
STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42698, NFIB V. SEBELIUS: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE (2012); John Elwood, What Did the Court “Hold” About the Commerce 
Clause and Medicaid?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/what-did-the-court-hold-about-the-commerce-
clause-and-medicaid/; Deborah Pearlstein, Early Thoughts on the Health Care Case, 
BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2012, 5:56 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/early-
thoughts-on-health-care-case.html; Steven D. Schwinn, Chief Justice Roberts’s Necessary and 
Proper Clause, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (July 2, 2012) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
conlaw/2012/07/chief-justice-robertss-necessary-and-proper-clause.html; Ilya Shapiro, We 
Won Everything But the Case, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/we-won-everything-but-the-case/; Ilya Somin, A 
Taxing, But Potentially Hopeful Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-taxing-but-potentially-hopeful-decision/; Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Chief Justice Roberts Comes Into His Own and Saves the Court While Preventing a 
Constitutional Debacle, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 3:41 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/chief-justice-roberts-comes-into-his-own-and-saves-
the-court-while-preventing-a-constitutional-debacle/. 
 5 Two symposia provide a snapshot of recent literature on the ACA: The American Right to 
Health: Constitutional, Statutory, and Contractual Healthcare Rights in the United States, 38 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 243 (2012); Everything But the Merits: Analyzing the Procedural Aspects of the Health 
Care Litigation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 691 (2012). 
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penalty, and the expansion of Medicaid, which facilitates public 
health insurance for the most impoverished members of our society.6 
With regard to the minimum coverage provision, popularly 
dubbed the “individual mandate,” Congress described the law as reg-
ulating both healthcare services and health insurance as a “significant 
part of the national economy.”7  Since 1944, Congress has understood 
that insurance may be regulated as interstate commerce.8  But, im-
portantly, Congress was regulating more than insurance in the 
ACA—it was leveling the insurance playing field to create near uni-
versal access to the healthcare system (which is also modified in mul-
tifarious ways by the ACA).9  Congress was aware of states that had 
failed at universal coverage when they did not institute an insurance 
coverage requirement, and legislative findings specifically pointed to 
the success experienced in Massachusetts in achieving better 
healthcare through creating an individual mandate to support its 
goal of universal coverage.10  Despite the extensive legislative history 
and the explicit legislative findings within the body of the law, Chief 
Justice Roberts and the joint dissent rejected Congress’s decisions 
with regard to the purposes and methods of regulating the 
healthcare market in NFIB.11 
 
 6 132 S. Ct. at 2580–82 (majority opinion) (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010) 
(the individual mandate) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396c, 1396d(y)(1) 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (provisions of the Medicaid expansion)). 
 7 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010) (describing the effects of the “[r]equirement to main-
tain minimum essential coverage” (health insurance) on the “national economy and in-
terstate commerce”). 
 8 See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 9 In the United States, health insurance acts as a doorway to medical care.  Though the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) creates a point of rescue in 
emergency rooms, those without health insurance cannot access medical care with any 
consistency unless they are wealthy enough to pay for their care out of pocket.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006); see generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COVERAGE MATTERS: 
INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, INSURING AMERICA’S 
HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2004) (both monographs explaining the 
connection between insurance and access and the vital role insurance plays in consistent 
medical care in the United States). 
 10 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2010) (“In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has 
strengthened private employer-based coverage . . . .”). 
 11 See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebe-
lius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 56–57, 73–74 (forthcoming Jan. 2013) (critiquing the lack of def-
erence to Congress’s legislative expertise), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128760; 
see also Pamela S. Karlan, Contempt of Court, BOSTON REVIEW, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 10, avail-
able at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.6/pamela_s_karlan_supreme_court_
contempt_congress.php (discussing the Court’s lack of deference to Congress and the 
executive branch in a variety of cases). 
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Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion began with an exposition on the 
virtues of federalism.12  The Roberts Court’s approach to federalism is 
no longer a mystery; reiterating Justice Kennedy’s federalism paean 
from Bond v. United States,13 Roberts extolled federalism as a protector 
of not only the states but also individuals.14  The Chief Justice’s inter-
est in continuing the Rehnquist Court’s active enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is now clear, though interestingly, the Tenth 
Amendment itself made rare appearances in the opinion.15 
While their opinions described the ACA,16 neither Chief Justice 
Roberts nor the members of the joint dissent appeared to be con-
cerned with its overarching purposes or Congress’s stated goals.  The 
description of the law written by Chief Justice Roberts was brief, 
which unto itself is not revealing.  More importantly, his brevity high-
lighted an ostensible disinterest in the language and purpose of the 
law.  The Chief Justice gave an impression of holding his nose while 
diving into the lengthy constitutional analysis that followed.17  Both 
 
 12 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577–80 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  The challenge did in-
volve federalism challenges and principles, and the Medicaid expansion directly affects 
the federal-state relationship, but by all accounts, the focus of this opinion and its com-
mentary was the individual mandate.  The Medicaid expansion is the blockbuster aspect 
of the opinion, and the federalism exposition is given context by the plurality’s ultimate 
holding that the expansion was unconstitutionally coercive, but Roberts’s discussion of 
federalism was a preamble for the whole opinion and somewhat misplaced in the context 
of the minimum coverage provision.  See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: 
Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation 
and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288 (2012) (critiquing the role of federalism in the NFIB 
litigation). 
 13 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
 14 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577–80 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  Justice Kennedy also expressed his 
desire to limit spending in Comstock: “The limits upon the spending power have not been 
much discussed, but if the relevant standard is parallel to the Commerce Clause cases, 
then the limits and the analytic approach in those precedents should be respected.”  
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 15 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (majority opinion) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s rejection 
of the States’ Tenth Amendment claim); id. at 2643 (joint dissent) (citing the Tenth 
Amendment as affirming the “structural limits on federal power”); U.S. CONST. amend. X 
(“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).  Arguably this is 
because the Court intended to describe Congress as exceeding its enumerated powers, 
but it also described the dangers to the states, which are protected by the Tenth Amend-
ment.  One would expect more direct reference to that amendment in such a discussion. 
 16 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580–82 (majority opinion); id. at 2644–46, 2657 (joint dissent). 
 17 The Chief Justice stated:  
We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies.  That judgment is 
entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders.  We ask only whether Congress has the 
power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions. . . . Members of 
this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the 
expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.  Those decisions are en-
trusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the 
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the Roberts opinion and the joint dissent moved quickly past the facts 
to expound their constitutional theories.18 
The best example of this disregard for the facts was that the Unit-
ed States argued that it was regulating the healthcare market, for 
which health insurance facilitates a point of access as well as a meth-
od of finance; yet, the Chief Justice and the joint dissent held that the 
pertinent market being regulated was health insurance, not the 
broader healthcare market.19  Perceived through the lens of the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance,20 as well as the deferential level of 
review the Court traditionally applies to exercises of the commerce 
power,21 this redefinition of the market being regulated was notably 
improper.22  In addition, it displayed a stilted understanding of the 
 
people disagree with them.  It is not our job to protect the people from the conse-
quences of their political choices. 
  See id. at 2577, 2579 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 18 This dynamic was echoed in the Roberts dissent in the other Medicaid decision during 
the October 2011 term, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211–
15 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 19 For just one example of this health insurance market choice, see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (disregarding the United States’ position that health insurance 
is part of the healthcare market); see also id. at 2644 (joint dissent) (phrasing the prob-
lem as one of “health insurance contracts”).  Ultimately, this rejection of the United 
States’ articulation of the commercial market being regulated facilitated the conclusion 
that Congress had the power to tax a choice not to purchase health insurance.  Uphold-
ing the individual mandate as a tax, Roberts accepted that the exercise of the taxing pow-
er required thinking differently about the individual mandate.  Instead of requiring pur-
chase, the taxing power allows Congress to “impos[e] a tax on those who do not buy that 
product.”  Id. at 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 20 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153–54 (2007) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 
(1895))) (describing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court wrote: “‘[T]he 
elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save 
a statute from unconstitutionality.’”). 
 21 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18–19, 22 (2005).  The Court wrote: “In assessing 
the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task be-
fore us is a modest one.  We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in 
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘ration-
al basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
557 (1995); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276–80 
(1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
252–53 (1964)). 
 22 See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist?  A Study of Inval-
idating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737 (2012) (empirically 
analyzing a data set that indicates that a justice’s ideology strongly correlates with the jus-
tice’s willingness to overturn a law of the opposite ideology and to uphold a law of the 
same ideology; one could infer that the Chief Justice’s conservative perspective made him 
more willing to second guess the wisdom of the ACA’s substance and structure). 
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ACA’s broadly inclusive approach to health insurance and thus 
healthcare access. 
Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion and the joint 
dissent mischaracterized, and misunderstood, the nature of the Med-
icaid expansion enacted in the ACA.  This amendment to the Medi-
caid Act expands eligibility to citizens under age 65 whose gross in-
come does not exceed 133% of the federal poverty level as of 2014.23  
States initially will be fully funded by the federal government for the 
cost of covering the expansion population; the federal match will 
phase down to ninety cents on the Medicaid dollar, a much higher 
match than states typically receive (50 to 83 cents).24  States’ non-
compliance with the Medicaid Act can end all or part of their Medi-
caid funding, but the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) has never exercised the option of total fund-
ing cut-off, because it would harm enrollees.25 
As a statutory matter, the eligibility expansion was not radical, as 
the Medicaid Act has always dictated the major elements of the pro-
gram that create a federal floor on which states may build.  Also, 
since its inception in 1965, the Medicaid Act has authorized the Sec-
retary of HHS to withdraw all Medicaid funding if a state is noncom-
pliant with the law.26  Further, as part of the effort to achieve universal 
health insurance coverage, eliminating eligibility variation was highly 
practical given the resistance to a more unitary reform of the health 
insurance system.  But, the Medicaid expansion was also a philosoph-
ical change that federalized the definition of eligibility for Medicaid 
and rejected the long-standing limitation on assisting only the “de-
serving poor.”27 
Both the Roberts plurality and the joint dissent accepted a stilted 
theory of the Medicaid expansion that the new category of eligibility 
was not part of the Medicaid Act but instead was part of the ACA.  As 
I and my co-authors have explained, this interpretation of the Medi-
 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 24 Id. § 1396d(y)(1). 
 25 Justice Kagan provided this answer for General Verrilli when he could not during oral 
arguments (perplexing, given Justice Kagan’s ultimate conclusion that the Medicaid ex-
pansion was unconstitutionally coercive).  See Nicole Huberfeld, Uncertainty on ACA Day 3 
(Exhaustion Sets In), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:52 AM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/03/uncertainty-on-aca-day-3-
exhaustion-sets-in.html; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 (2012) (opinion of Rob-
erts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (holding that the Medicaid expansion is uncon-
stitutional). 
 26 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).  In other words, the potential penalty for state noncompliance 
is neither radical nor new, despite the plurality’s contrary view. 
 27 For more on the threads of states’ rights and deserving poor in Medicaid’s history, see 
Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 436–53 (2011). 
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caid expansion is incorrect.28  It was wrong from a statutory perspec-
tive, because the Medicaid Act has always set the floor for Medicaid 
eligibility.  It was wrong from a constitutional perspective, because 
the premise that Medicaid was divided into two programs led to the 
faulty conclusion that the expansion was not germane and thus was 
unconstitutionally coercive. 
The United States defended its exercise of the spending power as 
consistent with the nature of the General Welfare Clause, consistent 
with the Court’s spending power decisions, and consistent with prin-
ciples of cooperative federalism.29  All of these defenses were correct 
given the existing jurisprudence; but, a long-standing spending pro-
gram such as Medicaid magnifies the under-theorization of the Dole 
test for conditions on federal spending.30  The states did not chal-
lenge the four-part test established by Dole; instead, they asked the 
Court to enliven the previously unenforced idea of unconstitutionally 
coercive conditional spending.31  The states offered no standard for 
solidifying the coercion theory beyond the bare assertion of their in-
ability to leave the Medicaid program.32  Seven justices adopted this 
thin idea, and none of them articulated a rule for coercion beyond 
stating that it was obvious in this case based on their interpretation of 
Medicaid.33 
Thus, for the plurality and the joint dissent, it appears that NFIB 
was a vehicle for constitutional change.  Not only did Chief Justice 
Roberts’s plurality skate over the realities of healthcare in the United 
States, it misconstrued the basic structure and nature of the Medicaid 
program, leading to the biggest doctrinal change in Spending Power 
jurisprudence since the Lochner Era.34  Because the plurality forms 
the precedent to be followed by lower federal courts, it is important 
that these errors not be perpetuated; one hopes that Justice Gins-
burg’s more thorough opinion will inform future decisions. 
 
 28 Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11 (detailing the reasons that this legislative 
interpretation is incorrect). 
 29 For more on the briefs of the United States in Douglas and Florida v. HHS, see Nicole Hu-
berfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 
21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513 (2012). 
 30 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (outlining a four-part test for the 
conditioning of federal spending). 
 31 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Ka-
gan, JJ.); Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court, supra note 29, at 528. 
 32 See Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court, supra note 29, at 530. 
 33 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 
2661–68 (joint dissent). 
 34 See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11, at 46 (critiquing the indeterminate 
contours of the freshly constructed coercion doctrine in light of the Court’s factual mis-
steps in the Medicaid analysis). 
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III.  AN OPPOSING VIEW OF HEALTHCARE REFORM 
Justice Ginsburg, writing a dissent in which Justices Breyer, So-
tomayor, and Kagan joined, began her opinion not with an explica-
tion of federalism but with an explanation of the national scale of the 
problems being addressed by the ACA.35  Likening it to the passage of 
the Social Security Act in the 1930s, Justice Ginsburg described the 
ACA as Congress’s effort to reform the entire healthcare market, a 
market that accounts for nearly 18% of the gross domestic product, a 
market in which everyone will participate but many cannot predict 
when.36  Justice Ginsburg described the nationwide problems of unin-
surance and escalating costs and noted that the states could not ad-
dress this problem on their own.37  She observed that Congress very 
clearly has the power to create a single-payer health insurance mech-
anism but that it chose to protect the roles of private insurers and 
states in fashioning the ACA’s national market reforms.38 
Thus, rather than beginning with a deconstruction of congres-
sional authority, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent displayed a thorough un-
derstanding of the problems facing American healthcare that drove 
Congress to find a federal solution to a national problem.  Both the 
discussion of the individual mandate and the discussion of Medicaid 
began with extensive explanations of the healthcare realities at stake, 
then applied those basic facts to the provisions of the ACA in ques-
tion, before providing a constitutional conclusion.39  The extra step of 
understanding the program facilitated a thicker analysis that should 
have carried the day. 
Like Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion expressed that the policy embraced by the ACA was Con-
gress’s to create, especially in defining the market being regulated;40 
unlike the plurality opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent expressed def-
 
 35 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609–12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 36 Id. at 2609–10. 
 37 Here is the flip side of Congress’s reliance on the Massachusetts model.  Massachusetts 
submitted a brief describing the influx of out-of-staters who took advantage of the state’s 
universal coverage and encouraging a national solution to the problem of uninsurance 
and underinsurance.  See id. at 2612.  Cooter and Siegel have described this issue as a 
problem of collective action that requires federal intervention rather than disparate state 
efforts.  See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory 
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010). 
 38 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 39 See, e.g., id. at 2629 (describing the nature and history of Medicaid as context for under-
standing the expansion). 
 40 Id. at 2619. 
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erence to Congress’s decision-making.41  This national market for 
medicine and the impact of health insurance on that market led Jus-
tice Ginsburg to conclude, correctly, that “[s]traightforward applica-
tion” of the “rational basis” review typically afforded national eco-
nomic policymaking led to an easy conclusion that “Congress had a 
rational basis for concluding that the uninsured, as a class, substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.”42  Working within the “novel con-
straint” (inactivity) on Congress’s commerce power fashioned by 
Roberts and the joint dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that all 
Americans participate in the healthcare market, thus they are not 
“inactive” for purposes of the new commerce analysis.  She also 
pointed out that risk pooling requires that everyone participate, re-
gardless of their youth or apparent health.43  The Ginsburg dissent on 
the individual mandate ended with an important warning against 
specious slippery slope arguments44 and a reiteration that novel line 
drawing does not stop the law from being an appropriate exercise of 
congressional authority.45 
Turning to the Medicaid expansion, Justice Ginsburg recognized 
the “federalism-based limits on the use of Congress’ conditional 
spending power” but also exposed Chief Justice Roberts’s fallacious 
claim that the ACA created a “new” Medicaid program.46  Joined only 
by Justice Sotomayor, she underlined the key fact that Medicaid is not 
two programs but one program with one goal, “to enable poor per-
sons to receive basic health care when they need it.”47  Justice Gins-
burg noted that the Medicaid expansion did exactly what Medicaid 
has always done, “enable States to provide medical assistance” to the 
poor, and did not amend most of the Medicaid Act.48  She rejected 
the premise that the Medicaid expansion constituted “a shift in kind, 
not merely degree,” when prior statutory expansions did not receive 
 
 41 Id. at 2614–15 (“Whatever one thinks of the policy decision Congress made, it was Con-
gress’ prerogative to make it.  Reviewed with appropriate deference, the minimum cover-
age provision . . . should survive measurement under the Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses.”). 
 42 Id. at 2617. 
 43 Id. at 2618–20.  Justice Ginsburg’s emphatic rejoinder to Roberts and the joint dissent 
that “Virtually everyone, I reiterate, consumes health care at some point in his or her life” 
seems especially poignant coming from a cancer survivor.  Id. at 2620. 
 44 Especially those involving broccoli. 
 45 Id. at 2624–28 (warning against the new line being drawn in Necessary and Proper Clause 
analysis). 
 46 Id. at 2634. 
 47 Id. at 2630. 
 48 Id. at 2635. 
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this treatment.49  Justice Ginsburg also critiqued the characterization 
of the expansion as a new program because courts should afford “a 
large measure of respect” to Congress’s description of its own law.50 
Justice Ginsburg also observed that Congress has power to repeal 
the Medicaid Act and replace it with “Medicaid II,” leading her to ac-
cuse the plurality and joint dissent of arbitrary line-drawing.51  This 
point highlighted the contradictory formalism expressed by the plu-
rality and dissent, that despite a statutory provision dating to the crea-
tion of Medicaid that reserves the right to amend or modify the pro-
gram, Medicaid could not be expanded in the manner chosen by 
Congress in the ACA because the states were somehow protected 
from such a modification.52 
Justice Ginsburg expressed concern about the Court’s failure to 
“fix the outermost line” of the “point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion”53 and warned that the Court failed to answer numerous 
questions.  These questions, including whether courts measure coer-
cion by the amount offered to the states by the federal government, 
the percentage of the state’s budget affected, what effects on states 
should figure into the constitutional analysis, and the combined ef-
fect of states refusing the spending conditions,54 are already inviting 
new litigation.55  Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg suggested that coercion 
is a political question that courts should not and cannot decide,56 yet 
seven justices agreed in principle that coercion is a judicially admin-
istrable concept.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent helped to highlight a ma-
jor problem with the legislative interpretation adopted by the plurali-
ty’s opinion. 
Even though only two justices found the Medicaid expansion to 
be a constitutional exercise of spending power, the ACA was saved by 
the severability provision in the Medicaid Act (Section 1303), which 
explicitly prevents the entire Social Security Act (of which Medicaid is 
 
 49 Id. at 2639.  For more factual analysis regarding the inaccuracies of the Roberts plurality 
on Medicaid, see Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11. 
 50 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 51 Id. 
 52 For more on Chief Justice Roberts’s formalist approach, see Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, 
To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 95–102 (2012). 
 53 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639–40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 54 Id. at 2640–41. 
 55 See, e.g., Petitioner’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12-2059 (1st 
Cir. Sep. 4, 2012) (requesting an order to require the government more expeditiously to 
approve Maine’s request to amend its Medicaid state plan and make eligibility changes as 
part of a plan to balance its state budget).  But see Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12-2059, 2012 
U.S. App. LEXIS 21083 (1st Cir. Sep. 13, 2012) (summarily denying petitioner’s motion 
for injunctive relief as moot). 
 56 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2640–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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a part) from being invalidated if any provision is found to be uncon-
stitutional.57  The plurality’s interpretive legerdemain was therein re-
vealed: section 1303, which was enacted in 1935 when the Social Se-
curity Act was passed, saved the Medicaid expansion from being 
struck down, even though the plurality had found the expansion to 
be a separate program from existing Medicaid for purposes of its 
constitutional analysis.58  In other words, the severability of the Medi-
caid Act saved a “new program” that was not Medicaid enough for 
purposes of Congress’s exercise of spending authority, but it was 
Medicaid enough for purposes of limiting the remedy for coercion.  
This type of severability analysis appears to be novel, and it has 
thrown other aspects of the Medicaid expansion into some disarray.59 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined the majority in this bi-
zarre legislative maneuver, which was consistent with their analysis of 
Medicaid being one program and thus the expansion being constitu-
tional.60  A majority of five ultimately protected the Medicaid expan-
sion, at least to a degree, by making it an unenforceable mandate that 
states could choose not to participate in without jeopardizing their 
existing Medicaid funding.61  But, the not-Medicaid-but-Medicaid leg-
islative gymnastics highlight the faulty factual findings of the majority 
in contrast with the internal consistency of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In short, Justice Ginsburg endeavored to get the facts right, mak-
ing hers the opinion to read for anyone who wants to understand 
how the constitutional questions should have been answered in NFIB 
as well as how the healthcare programs at issue actually operate.  The 
recent presidential election confirms that the ACA will not be re-
pealed and will be effectuated.  It would be easy to dismiss the varia-
tions in legislative interpretation as a reflection of ideology in a com-
plex, contentious, and unusually high-profile case, but the decision 
seems to invite further litigation.  That further litigation offers an 
opportunity to compound not only the bad legislative interpretation 
but also the sweeping constitutional analysis in the decision.  At least 
 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006). 
 58 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 59 See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11, at 76–84 (explaining the open statu-
tory questions that arose due to the severing of the Medicaid expansion and the removal 
of the Secretary’s ability to limit funding to the states for nonparticipation). 
 60 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 61 The joint dissent would have invalidated the ACA in its entirety, and the opinion rejected 
this remedy for the agreed-upon unconstitutionality of the Medicaid expansion.  Id. at 
2668 (joint dissent). 
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two concerns are worth mentioning here: first, NFIB reinforces a con-
cern that the Court tends not to do healthcare or any other highly 
regulated and complex area very well.62  The Court had plenty of 
amicus briefs available to help it discern the meaning of the ACA 
even if it chose not to accept Congress’s findings, yet the opinions 
created an impression that healthcare was just a vehicle for constitu-
tional projects. 
Second, the influx of new Medicaid enrollees will highlight a la-
tent problem in the Medicaid Act itself that was complicated by the 
ACA and NFIB.  If all states implement the Medicaid expansion, the 
ACA will add an estimated twenty-one million enrollees into the Med-
icaid program by 2022, but the remedies available to them when 
states fail to deliver the promised benefits of Medicaid are both un-
stable and in flux.63  Last term, in Douglas v. Independent Living Center 
of Southern California, the Court came close to invalidating Supremacy 
Clause private rights of action by providers and enrollees who do not 
receive benefits promised by the Medicaid Act.64  Justice Breyer’s ma-
jority opinion thwarted such a sweeping decision by insisting that 
HHS exercise primary jurisdiction in the case.65  Interestingly, the 
Douglas majority opinion also displayed a concern for Medicaid as a 
program, not just the constitutional questions in the case.66  In con-
trast, the dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts jumped straight to 
the Supremacy Clause question with little regard for the statutory 
scheme or import of the program at hand, consistent with his ap-
 
 62 See, e.g., Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 11, at 9 & n.38 (referring to an in-
stance where a justice admitted at oral argument that he often confused Medicare and 
Medicaid).  The judiciary’s deficiencies in making healthcare-related decisions often arise 
in the end-of-life context.  See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 
36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 (1994) (advocating for mediation in end-of-life decision-making to 
remove the process from under-equipped courts); I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR 
and End of Life Decision-making, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004) (advocating for alter-
native dispute resolution to remove end-of-life disputes from courts given the inadequa-
cies displayed in the Schiavo dispute); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE 
THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 38 
(2003) (describing courts’ involvement in the formation of healthcare rights as “far from 
consistent”).  My observation is slightly broader, that the Court does not perform 
healthcare-related analysis particularly well and tends to focus on the constitutional issue 
rather than the healthcare context in which it sits, and NFIB is a microcosm of that prob-
lem. 
 63 See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, PUB. 
NO. 8384, THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION: 
NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/8384.pdf. 
 64 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). 
 65 Id. at 1210–11. 
 66 Id. at 1208–09. 
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proach in NFIB.67  The likelihood that more Medicaid enforcement 
actions will arise with the influx of new enrollees is bound to test the 
Court’s misconstrual of the Medicaid program in NFIB. 
It is often said that bad facts make bad law.  In this case, the facts 
themselves were not bad, but certain justices seemed disposed to by-
passing the facts.  Thus, in NFIB, a bad reading of the facts has led to 
newly shaped constitutional interpretation for three of Congress’s 
major Article I powers (commerce, spending, and necessary and 
proper),68 and this new interpretation has the potential not only to 
impact new healthcare cases, but also to facilitate additional chal-


























 67 Id. at 1211–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  See also Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the 
Court, supra note 29, at 515–27 (describing the Douglas litigation); Brietta R. Clark, Medi-
caid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama Administration Is Undermining Its 
Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771 (2012) (highlighting Medicaid’s remedy prob-
lem and the ways in which the Obama Administration has been undermining its own ex-
pansion of Medicaid by articulating a desire to eliminate at least some private rights of ac-
tion against states). 
 68 Four, if the tax power analysis is deemed “new.” 
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